Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2003

Foreword: Revisiting Gilson and Kraakman’s Efficiency Story
Donald C. Langevoort
Georgetown University Law Center, langevdc@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/143

28 J. Corp. L. 499-502 (2003)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

GEORGETOWN LAW
Faculty Publications

January 2010

Foreword:
Revisiting Gilson and Kraakman’s Efficiency
Story
28 J. Corp. L. 499-502 (2003)

Donald C. Langevoort
Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center
langevdc@law.georgetown.edu
This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/143/
Posted with permission of the author

Foreword: Revisiting Gilson and Kraakman's Efficiency
Story

Donald C. Langevoort*
Gilson and Kraakman's Mechanisms of Market Efficiencyl is part of the canon of
modem corporate law scholarship, one of a handful of articles that has profoundly
influenced the way we think about the field. It is also enigmatic, warranting a fresh look
by those who think they know what it says from some long-ago reading or second-hand
references by other authors.
Obligatory citations to Mechanisms often treat it as the kind of faithful embrace of a
strong vision of capital market efficiency so common in the early 1980's-citing
Easterbrook and Fischel for the normative implications of market efficiency, Gilson and
Kraakman for how markets become efficient. But the latter is something of a citation
half-truth. True, the article is an explanation of the various ways information becomes
impounded in market price, and optimistically concedes that this is often a rapid and
effective process. A reader inclined toward efficiency finds enou,gh to justify his own
faith.
But that is not all-or really what-the article is about. The underlying insight is
that there is a repertoire of mechanisms that operate with different levels of power as
efficiency-drivers, depending on the relative availability and initial distribution of the
information in question. In tum, relative availability is a function of the costs of acquiring
and verifying it. Institutions-like underwritten public offerings-may arise to lower the
costs of verifying issuer disclosures, contributing to efficiency in primary capital raising
transactions. The punch line, however, is that markets will demonstrate different levels of
efficiency in impounding different kinds of information. This transaction cost story
means that even informational efficiency is a relative concept, filled with imperfections
when the costs associated with discovery and verification are significant-hardly a bornagain confession of faith.
The residual agnosticism becomes clear toward the end of the article. Gilson and
Kraakman take aim at prevailing claims that insider trading should not be prohibited
because it contributes to more efficient pricing for failing to recognize the difficulty the
market has in decoding the informational content of an insider's trades. They then also
take aim at George Benston's famous claim that the mandatory disclosure regime
imposed by the federal securities laws in the 1930's delivered no appreciable value to
investors. In the early 1980's, these claims held great influence over the thinking of
efficiency-minded academics. Gilson and Kraakman issue a cautionary warning about
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assuming too much about the mechanisms of efficiency, and not paying enough attention
to the cost problem.
Had they been a bit bolder, then, they might have stricken "mechanisms" from their
title and substituted something like "limits" or, borrowing from Grossman and Stiglitz,
"impossibility."2 In any event, the limits to the efficiency aspect of the article anticipates
and inspires a line of scholarship that evolved over the next twenty years about market
failures-particularly in the form of agency cost problems-that make strong
deregulatory claims problematic.
This Symposium pays tribute to Mechanisms' originality, dispassion, rigor, and
intluence. The idea was to ask a diverse mix of scholars-with an emphasis on some of
the best young minds that have come into this field to work recently-to take inspiration
from Gilson and Kraakman and write whatever they wished about the contemporary state
of mind regarding market efficiency. Some are strong critics of the efficient market
hypothesis; others still work happily within its framework. Their subjects run from the
stock markets themselves to matters like the law of trusts, using antitrust in securities
market regulation, and how the takeover market differs in terms of the diffusion of
information. Afterwards, Gilson and Kraakman respond, both commenting on the papers
and offering their own retlections on Mechanisms, many years (and much thinking) later.
One question that intrigued many of the Symposium's participants when the papers
were presented is why an uncontlicted vision of efficiency gained such a hold in
academia for such a long time. In other words, why was Mechanisms cited far more for
the support it gives to the market's efficiency properties, than its just-as-clear warnings
about too readily assuming informational efficiency in the presence of significant
acquisition or verification costs? Today, market efficiency is highly contested. Many
scholars believe that markets are efficient enough, and decidedly superior to other
mechanisms (e.g., judicial or bureaucratic intervention) for assessing the value of
securities or firms-others do not. The working consensus, however, is that Gilson and
Kraakman's fundamental point about the limits of efficiency with respect to costly or
hard-to-verify information is right, and hence efficiency is a matter of degree. But that
more ambivalent intellectual stance is of relatively recent vintage. For most of the 1980's,
at least, and to some extent well beyond, efficiency ruled.
The reasons for that domination are complicated. No doubt the story begins, as
Gilson and Kraakman note at the outset of their article, with the seemingly solid
empirical support it had garnered during the 1970's. Financial economists marshaled an
impressive case in favor of the efficient market hypothesis-the study of anomalies was
in its infancy, largely uninteresting to legal academics, and behavioral finance
scholarship was an invention yet to come. There was ample support for assuming a high
degree of "semi-strong" market efficiency, and as many have noted, those implications
led to a series of unconventional, challenging, and rigorously demonstrable normative
insights-the scholar's holy grail. At just this time, in tum, two related phenomena about
which efficiency theory had much to say-hostile corporate takeovers and insider
trading-were quickly becoming matters of cultural and political fascination. Scholars
embracing efficiency therefore could not only be challenging but important, with

2. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
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currency outside their otherwise obscure discipline. But bold, confident claims were
necessary to establish the scholarly voice here: doubt or ambiguity was disfavored.
No doubt there is a political dimension to all this. We tend to think today of the proefficiency move as innately conservative. In the late 1970's and very early 1980's,
however, proponents of increased market competition, invoking the mantle of economic
efficiency, were often politically progressive, attacking governmentally-supported
monopolies and oligopolies as rent-extracting "big business." In securities regulation, the
challenges of that decade to the hegemony of the New York Stock Exchange, and the
emergence of the idealized national market system were examples of conventional
economic theory enlisted in the name of pro-investor reform. The rhetoric of efficiency in
the name of open competition had a small hint of populism to it. The generation of legal
scholars who learned conventional economic analysis at that time did so without
necessarily carrying any right-wing baggage.
The 1980's gradually moved the idealization of "free markets" to the right, in an
ever more aggressive search for forms of regulation that could be challenged as
unnecessary interference with competition in order to shrink the governmental domain.
More and more of corporate and securities law was questioned as bureaucratically
misguided paternalism or, invoking public choice theory, rent-seeking protectionism by
entrenched interests. Some of this, of course, was on the mark. But the enthusiastic
reception was also the product of support from those who found these intellectual ideas
good cover for a political agenda. Those favoring a largely unfettered hostile takeover
market, or the elimination of mandatory disclosure requirements, were happy to promote
the scholarship and enlist the scholars on their behalf. While this political transformation
was happening, however, its background was one in which market-oriented economic
analysis still attracted a broad range of scholars and policy-makers. When Gilson and
Kraakman published Mechanisms in 1984, the market for scholarship was primed for
pro-efficiency work, and it was read largely in that light.
The brief embrace of strong market efficiency by the SEC illustrates the demand
side story of which Mechanism takes note in its opening paragraph. 3 In a handful of rule
adoptions by the Commission in the early 1980's, the efficient market hypothesis was
highlighted as justification for deregulation. As I have tried to show elsewhere, the
Commission's embrace was more fac;ade than substance: the deregulatory steps could
easily be justified on cost-benefit grounds even without any strong assumptions about
efficiency.4 But the very fact that even the SEC was, for a short time, willing to pledge its
allegiance to the rhetoric of market efficiency testifies to its allure during that period.
Eventually, the idealization of the markets faded and, as noted above, the scholarly
consensus began to accept a more ambivalent view of marketplace efficiency and its
limits. Here, again, the story is more complicated than it seems. Abuses in the takeover
market and the string of insider trading scandals in the mid and late 1980's made strong
deregulatory positions less appealing than they had been. Economists were challenging
the empirical underpinnings of the efficient market hypothesis, and alternative theories of
market price behavior were emerging rapidly. In the early 1990's, the political climate
3. Mechanisms, supra note I, at 550, n.3-4.
4. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories. Assumptions and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1991) (analyzing the "gulf' that has developed between current economics literature
and the conception of market efficiency in the legal culture).
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shifted, albeit briefly, altering the balance of intellectual influence in policy-making. Had
Mechanisms been published even five years later than it was, its substantive contribution
would have been much the same and just as valuable, but I suspect it would have been
interpreted differently by many of its readers. Now, of course, we have had scandals like
Enron and W orldcom that have further weakened the faith. 5
A re-reading of Mechanisms shows how well it actually anticipated many of the
scholarly moves that followed in the next two decades. There are two footnotes, for
example, taking note of early work doubting whether market efficiency is as wellgrounded empirically as its proponents were claiming.6 Gilson and Kraakman observe
that departures from efficiency are "precisely what we would expect where publiclyannounced information is genuinely new and difficult to value, and where large numbers
of traders consequently elect not to invest in valuation costs."7
The authors are also careful to focus their attention on the informational efficiency
of the markets in contrast to fundamental efficiency-markets can have a rapid speed of
adjustment without necessarily producing a rational equilibrium. To be sure, Mechanisms
at many places assumes that noise trading is largely unsystematic and, therefore, nets out
in an unbiased fashion. But it does not deny that noise trading could lead to sustained
departures from fundamental value. Indeed, that very idea was pursued four years later by
Reinier Kraakman in a thoughtful paper on hostile takeovers, not cited as frequently as it
should be, showing that evidence of noisy stock prices makes it hard to devise an optimal
regulatory policy. If stock prices can be "irrationally" depressed over a sustained period,
takeovers directed at such firms are a form of cherry-picking without efficiency benefits. 8
In making this claim, he was not repudiating anything in Mechanisms. And it is hardly a
large step to go from Mechanisms' discussion of derivatively informed trading to models
of momentum trading that are commonplace in the contemporary finance literature. 9
Paying tribute to Mechanisms is not to say that it got everything right. Its scholarly
virtue is subtlety and restraint; it is careful not to over-claim at a time when other scholars
seemed sure and confident in their roles as intellectual norms entrepreneurs. It recognized
the difficulties and challenges of regulation, and the need for much more work. Gilson
and Kraakman provoked hard thinking about market mechanisms among a generation of
scholars, and helped set in motion a progressive research program still on-going today.
For this, as well as its many enduring insights, it deserves its place in the canon.

5. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Meansfor the Management and Control of the Modern Business
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002).
6. Mechanisms, supra note I, at 551 n.IO, 626 n.205.
7. Id. at 626 n.205.
8. Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an
AcqUisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891 (1988).
9. E.g., Harrison Hong & Jeremy Stein, A Unified Theory of Underreaction Momentum Trading and
Overreaction in Asset Markets, 54 J. FIN. 2143 (1999).
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